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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL
\
SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIA- \
TION, a corporation,
I
Plaintiff and Respondent, I
vs.
> Case No. 8720
HARTFORD ACCIDENT &
I
INDEMNITY COMPANY,
\
a corporation,
I
Defendant and Appellant. I
BRIEF OF PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS
& LOAN ASSOCIATION, RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent adopts generally Appellant's statement of facts, but must add certain omitted matters.
This case was consolidated for trial with two other
cases likewise involving suits against Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company and all arising out of
the same Contract Bond (Ex. Pr-1) which reads as
follows, (Appellant quoted only certain portions):
l
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"KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That We, CASSADY COMPANY, Inc.,
a Utah corporation, and C. P. CASSADY of
Arcadia, California, (hereinafter called the
PRINCIPAL) and HARTFORD ACCIDENT
AND INDEMNITY COMPANY, a corporation, with its principal office in Hartford,
Connecticut, and authorized to transact surety business in the State of Utah, (hereinafter
called the SURETY) are held and firmlybound and obligated unto PRUDENTIAL
FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, a corporation of the United States
of America, (hereinafter called LENDER
OBLIGEE) and unto FELT SYNDICATE,
a corporation of the State of Utah, (hereinafter called the OWNER OBLIGEE), and
unto PACIFIC COAST TITLE INSURANCE
COMPANY, a corporation of the State of
Utah (hereinafter called TITLE OBLIGEE),
as their respective interests may appear as
obligees in the sum of SEVEN HUNDRED
SIXTY THREE THOUSAND AND NO/100
($763,000.00) DOLLARS lawful money of
the United. States of America, for the payment
of which PRINCIPAL AND SURETY bind
themselves, their heirs, executors, administrators, successors, and assigns, jointly and severally, firmly by these presents.
WHEREAS, the PRINCIPAL has entered into a contract with the OWNER OBLIGEE for the construction of dwelling
houses and appurtenant improvements in a
housing project known and designated as
Morningside Heights Subdivision, located in
Salt Lake County, Utah, which contract is by
2
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reference incorporated herein and made a part
hereof; and
WHEREAS, the LENDER OBLIGEE
has agreed to lend to each qualified borrower,
upon the security of a first lien mortgage, a
sum of money to be used in the construction
of a dwelling house and appurtenant improvements upon a lot in said housing project owned by the borrower; and
WHEREAS, the funds loaned by the
LENDER OBLIGEE on the security of said
first lien mortgage will be used with the consent of the borrower in making payments due
the PRINCIPAL under said contract; and
WHEREAS, the TITLE OBLIGEE will
issue ATA title insurance policies on each lot
or parcel of real estate upon which the LENDER OBLIGEE makes a mortgage loan as
herein stated; and
WHEREAS, the LENDER OBLIGEE,
TITLE OBLIGEE, and OWNER OBLIGEE
each desire protection as their interests may
appear, in event of default by the PRINCIPAL under said contract, said protection to
be subject to the performance by the LENDER OBLIGEE, the TITLE OBLIGEE, and
the OWNER OBLIGEE of their respective
obligations to the PRINCIPAL in connection
with said contract;
NOW, THEREFORE, the condition of
this obligation is such that if the PRINCIPAL
well and truly performs all the undertakings,
covenants, conditions and agreements of said
contract on its part and fully indemnifies
and saves harmless the obligees from all loss,
3
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cost, damage, and expense which they may
suffer, either jointly and severally, by reason
of failure so to do, and fully reimburses and
repays obligees all outlay and expense which
said obligees may incur in making good any
such default; and, further, if the PRINCIPAL shall pay all persons who have contracted, or will have contracted, directly with
PRINCIPAL for services or labor or materials furnished under the provisions of said
contract, and shall keep and maintain each
lot or building-site free and clear of labor and
material liens, then this obligation shall be
void; otherwise, it shall remain in full force
and effect.
The foregoing, however, is subject to the
following provisions:
1. The LENDER OBLIGEE shall have
prior right and lien under this Bond as against
the other Obligees herein named.
2. The SURETY and PRINCIPAL
agree that, in the event the PRINCIPAL shall
default in the performance of the undertakings, covenants, terms, conditions, and agreements of said contract on its part, the SURETY will have the option to cure and remedy
said default and complete performance of said
contract.
3. The SURETY shall not be liable under this Bond to the Obligees, and either of
them, unless the Obligees, or either of them,
shall make payment to the PRINCIPAL in
reasonable compliance with the terms of said
contract as to payments, and each shall perform all other obligations to be performed by
4
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each Obligee under said contract at the time
and in the manner therein set forth.
4. The SURETY agrees that any right
of action or claim that either of the Obligees
herein might have under this Bond may be
subordinated to the other, and that such subordination will in no manner invalidate or
qualify this Bond. The SURETY further
agrees to recognize any such agreement of
subordination and priority upon being furnished with signed evidence thereof.
5. No suit, action, or proceeding by reason of any default, whatever, shall be brought
on this Bond after two (2) years from the
date on which the final payment under the
contract falls due, provided, however, that in
the event there exists or is pending any collateral litigation which has the effect of making
it impossible for any Obligee under this Bond
to determine its rights hereunder, a suit, action, or other proceeding under this Bond may
be instituted within six (6) months after
entry of final judgment in said collateral
litigation.
6. The prior written approval of SURETY shall be required with regard to any
changes or alterations in said contract where
the cost thereof, added to prior changes or
alterations, causes the aggregate cost of all
changes and alterations to exceed 10 per cent
of the original contract price; but, except as
to the foregoing, any alterations which may
be made in the terms of the contract, or in the
work to be done under it, or the giving by the
Obligees of any extensions of time for the
performance of the contract, or any other
forbearance on the part of either the Obligees
5
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or PRINCIPAL to the other, shall not in any
way release SURETY or PRINCIPAL of the
obligations of this instrument, notice of SURETY of any such alterations, extensions, or
forbearance being hereby waived.
7. The aggregate liability of SURETY
hereunder to the Obligees or their assigns is
limited to the penal sum above stated, and
SURETY, upon making any payment hereunder shall be subrogated to, and shall be entitled to an assignment of, all rights of the
payee, either against PRINCIPAL or against
any other party liable to the payee in connection with the loss which is the subject of
the payment.
SIGNED, SEALED AND DATED
21st day of July, 1950.
PREMIUM ON THIS
BOND IS $7,630.00
CASSADY COMPANY, INC
By
/ s / C. P. Cassady
/ s / C. P. Cassady
HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND
INDEMNITY COMPANY
By
/ s / A. L. Blackburn
Attorney-in-Fact"
All parties knew that the financing program
was such that individual loans were to be made to
veteran purchasers of the lots in Morningside
Heights and that until and when each lot had been
sold, a note and mortgage executed, the proposed
6
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veteran-borrower approved by the U. S. Veterans
Administration, the mortgage actually recorded and
the A-T-A policy of title insurance issued, Prudential had no right or duty to disburse any funds.
This same procedure had to be repeated 100 times
as such was a prerequisite to the disbursing of funds
on each and all of the 100 separate loans.
Even as Hartford complains that it's bonded
contractor, Cassady, had problems on procurement
of materials because of the outbreak of the Korean
crisis shortly following the execution of the Contract Bond, so too, the selling of these lots to veterans for future construction of dwellings became
more difficult in light of the Korean crisis and their
possible recalling into active duty.
As shown by Appellant's statement of facts,
problems arose between Cassady as contractor, the
suppliers of materials, Felt and Prudential throughout the last five months of 1950. In compromise
settlement of such difficulties, the contractor, Cassady which had agreed to complete all 100 houses
within 180 days from July 19, 1950 (Exh. PR-2),
sought and received an extension of time for completion up to June 1st, 1951. This was by "Supplemental Agreement" dated February 16, 1951 (Ex.
PR-6).
The said compromise settlement of prior difficulties and differences so dated February 16, 1951
7
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

provided that Prudential was given certain options
as to disbursement of the funds. The said Supplemental Agreement (PR-6) provided in part,
"D. The balance of the loan proceeds,
plus and deposited funds and the down payment, if any, shall be disbursed by PRUDENTIAL from and after the date of this Supplemental Agreement at such time or times,
in such manner and in such amounts as in
the sole judgment and discretion of PRUDE TIAL is necessary and proper to secure
the expeditious completion of the aforesaid
dwelling houses and to assure the payment
of all subcontractors, materialmen and laborers engaged in work on said project. The decision of PRUDENTIAL as to the time, manner, method and amount of payments shall
be conclusive and shall be binding upon the
parties hereto. Notwithstanding the immediate foregoing provision, PRUDENTIAL is
hereby authorized and empowered to withhold ten per cent (10%) of all loan proceeds
and down payments and not pay the same
until the dwelling houses shall have passed
final inspection by FEDERAL HOUSING
ADMINISTRATION; VETERANS ADMINISTRATION or PRUDENTIAL and all qualifications have been met to secure mortgage
insurance by Federal Housing Administration or guarantee by Veterans Administration."
In partial recognition of the increase of costs
and in an apparent effort to compromise the claims
made by Cassady as to Felt's responsibility therefor,
this Supplemental Agreement of February 16, 1951
8
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in paragraph I of Article III increased the price
per house to be paid to Cassady. The parties also
confirmed and approved all disbursements of the
funds paid by Prudential to Associated Accountants
and then Felt, Cassady and Accountants "hereby
irrevocably admit that they, and each of them, have
secured from Prudential an accounting of the proceeds of all mortgage loans and down payments and
the disbursal of same by Prudential to the date
hereof." And then they further, "hereby admit,
agree and declare that Prudential has performed all
of its obligations under said Primary Contract and
Disbursing Contract and supplement thereto dated
the 22nd day of August 1950, from the respective
dates thereof to the date of this Supplemental Agreement."
This said document (PR-6) extending the time
of completion, establishing new disbursing procedures and discretionary powers in Prudential and
acknowledging the full accounting by Prudential
to date, was then signed by all parties. The appellant, as the Surety Company, did not dissent or
object to the document or the provisions but affixed
its approval in the following terms "Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, as Surety on the
bond of Cassady Company, Inc. does hereby consent
to amended paragraphs 22 and 23 and 7 of the construction contract in connection with which its bond
has been given."
9
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It is noted from that February 16,1951 Supplemental Agreement, that the changes approved by
Hartford are: Paragraph 7 which modified the former contract to extend the time of completion from
January 19, 1951 to June 1, 1951; paragraph 22 is
the one increasing the price per house; and paragraph 23 grants to Prudential discretionary powers
of disbursement. Those three were the only specific changes made in the primary construction contract of July 19, 1950; upon which the bond was
issued, thus there was no occasion for Hartford's
endorsement in February of 1951 to be any broader.
As no issue or complaint is made by the appellant as to the amount of the damages, $88,723.85,
found by the trial Court to have been suffered by
Prudential, we shall not add any of the many facts
testified to in support of that judgment. We join
with Appellant in conceding that such amount was
properly found and awarded by the trial Court.
SPECIAL NOTE:
1. In preparing this brief the term "Prudential" refers to Prudential Savings & Loan Association ; the term "Felt" refers to Felt Syndicate, Inc.;
the term "Cassady" refers to Cassady Co., Inc. and
C. P. Cassady; and the term "Pacific" refers to
Pacific Coast Title Insurance Company.
2. In referring to the transcript of testimony,
10
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the black typed numerals are used instead of the red
numerals.
POINTS
POINT I
THE FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF
PRUDENTIAL ARE SUPPORTED BY ADEQUATE,
COMPETENT AND MATERIAL EVIDENCE.
POINT II
THIS IS A LAW CASE AND THE FINDINGS OF
THE TRIAL COURT ARE ENTITLED TO APPROVAL
BY THE SUPREME COURT IF SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE.
POINT III

THE PARTIES TO THE PRIMARY CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT AND THE CONTRACT BOND COMPROMISED AND SETTLED ANY AND ALL PRIOR
CLAIMED CONTRACT BREACHES BY THE SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT OF FEBRUARY 16, 1951.
POINT IV
HARTFORD IS ESTOPPED TO DENY THAT THE
SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT OF FEBRUARY 16,
1951 COMPROMISED AND SETTLED PRIOR ALLEGED BREACHES BY FELT AND PRUDENTIAL.
POINT V
EXPRESSIONS OF OPINION AS TO THE CONSTRUCTION OR INTERPRETATION OF A CONTRACT
BY ONE OF THE PARTIES THERETO AFTER A
CONTROVERSY HAS ARISEN AS TO THE LIABILITY
TO IT OF THE OTHER PARTY TO THE CONTRACT
AND NOT ACTED UPON BY THE OTHER PARTY
HAVE NO WEIGHT OR RELEVANCY IN INTERPRETING THE CONTRACT.
11
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POINT VI
THE RULE GOVERNING THE INTERPRETATION
OF CONTRACTS THAT WHERE A CONTRACT BEARS
MORE THAN ONE REASONABLE MEANING AN INTERPRETATION IS PREFERRED WHICH OPERATES
MORE STRONGLY AGAINST THE PARTY FROM
WHOM IT PROCEEDS HAS NO APPLICATION IN
THIS CASE. HARTFORD'S REPRESENTATIVE CRITICALLY EXAMINED A PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF
THE BOND MADE BY PRUDENTIAL, ALTERED IT
SEVERAL RESPECTS; CAUSED THE BOND TO BE
TYPEWRITTEN IN HIS OWN OFFICE AND FINALLY
EXECUTED IT ON BEHALF OF HARTFORD. THE
BOND IS IN LEGAL EFFECT AN INSURANCE CONTRACT AND HARTFORD IS A COMPENSATED SURETY AGAINST WHOM THE BOND WILL BE CONSTRUED FAVORABLE TO THE OBLIGEES.
POINT VII
PRUDENTIAL DID NOT VIOLATE ANY OF ITS
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS OWING BY IT EITHER
TO HARTFORD, CASSADY OR FELT SUCH AS WOULD
BAR ITS RECOVERY OF DAMAGES.
POINT VIII
IN ARRIVING AT A CORRECT CONSTRUCTION
AND INTERPRETATION OF THE BOND, THE COURT
SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT THE ACTIVITIES OF
PACIFIC AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THIS CASE
ARE WHOLLY IMMATERIAL AND IRRELEVANT,
AND THAT PRUDENTIAL IS A THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY UNDER THE CONTRACT BETWEEN FELT
AND CASSADY DATED JULY 19, 1950 (EX. PR-2).
THE COURT SHOULD THEN APPLY CERTAIN WELL
RECOGNIZED RULES OF INTERPRETATION AND
CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS.
12
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POINT IX
VIOLATIONS (IF SUCH VIOLATIONS OCCURRED) BY FELT OF ITS CONTRACTS WITH CASSADY
CANNOT BE IMPUTED TO PRUDENTIAL SO AS TO
BAR PRUDENTIAL'S RECOVERY AGAINST HARTFORD ON THE BOND. THE BOND SECURED DISTINCT AND SEPARATE RIGHTS OF THE OBLIGEES.
HARTFORD ASSUMED DISTINCT OBLIGATIONS TO
PRUDENTIAL WHICH DID NOT RUN TO EITHER
FELT OR PACIFIC AND PRUDENTIAL MAY THEREFORE HAVE ITS SEPARATE ACTION FOR THE
BREACH OF THOSE OBLIGATIONS. HARTFORD CANNOT DEFEND PRUDENTIAL'S ACTION ON THE
GROUND THAT THE OTHER OBLIGEES, OR EITHER
OF THEM, VIOLATED THE CONTRACTS WITH CASSADY OR BREACHED CONDITIONS OF THE BOND.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF
PRUDENTIAL ARE SUPPORTED BY ADEQUATE,
COMPETENT AND MATERIAL EVIDENCE.
POINT II
THIS IS A LAW CASE AND THE FINDINGS OF
THE TRIAL COURT ARE ENTITLED TO APPROVAL
BY THE SUPREME COURT IF SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE.

The Morningside Heights Subdivision required
financing through an individual mortgage on each
of the one hundred lots. No project, construction
loan was intended or ever contracted. As prospective
Veteran purchasers were found for the one hundred
lots, each applied separately for a loan from Pru13
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dential. Each loan necessarily had to go through
the customary processing of loan applications, credit
report, inspection, approval by the Veterans Administration, approval by the loan committee, execution of the note and mortgage, search of the
records, recording of the mortgage and issuance
of a policy of title insurance.
Knowing of this and being experienced in the
complications of loans to Veterans, Prudential was
unwilling to accept a "supervisory" type of bond
as originally tendered by Cassady. (C. J. Cassady's
deposition, Ex. H39, P. 6, R. 281). All parties were
advised as to the project generally and Prudential
required a performance bond generally such as was
finally executed by Hartford. Then in reliance upon
this bond, rather than the newly formed corporation, Cassady Company, it proceeded to loan moneys
on the separate 100 mortgages as and when the
same were executed and delivered.
With nearly $1,000,000.00 committed to this
Morningside Heights project, and being subject to
disbursement of the loaned moneys as authorized by
the several Veteran borrowers, Prudential could not
indiscriminately pour in money to meet the needs
of Cassady. The financial troubles of Cassady stem
from many sources, not merely lags in the availability of funds from the mortgages. The evidence
shows that Cassady was without adequate financing
14
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of its own to carry forward independent of the loan
proceeds. Cassady's construction practices apparently were not efficient. There was inadequate supervision of the work and materials of the subcontractors made by Cassady. Not one of the 100
houses was ever taken to final completion by Cassady so as to procure the required approval by the
Veterans1 Administration, and the guaranty of
Prudential's mortgages.
Prudential was not responsible for those basic
causes of the breakdown, nor were either of the
other two obligees of the Bond, Felt and Pacific.
They all relied upon Hartford's Bond to guarantee
performance by Cassady. Cassady by the primary
construction contract of July 19, 1950, covered by
the Bond, agreed to cause construction to be started
within ten days and"carried forward diligently and
expeditiously until all of the one hundred houses
have been completed . . . within 180 days from the
date of execution of this agreement. . ." (Para. 26,
Ex. PR-2). The paragraph extended the completion
time should delays be caused by Felt. Then it reiterated that Cassady "covenants and agrees that
the construction of said houses shall be completed
within the time herein set forth. Time is declared
to be of the essence." Paragraph 2 of this same
basic construction contract bound Cassady to construct the 100 houses "in strict conformity with the
15
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specifications, plans and drawings" and "also in
accordance with the rules and regulations of the
Veterans Administration, the Federal Housing Administration and the Prudential Federal Savings
and Loan Association, as the case may be."
Why was it vital to Prudential that such construction be completed as scheduled and in accordance with the rules of the Veterans Administration
and that it have a guaranty of such performance
by Hartford? Prudential had agreed to loan about
$1,000,000.00 to the 100 prospective Veteran borrowers, when they were found and proper mortgages
had been executed, approved and recorded. These
were only 4% interest bearing loans for 100% of
the appraised value of the dwellings if completed
in accordance with the Veterans Administration
rules and had a duration of 25 years. Upon such
completion, the loans were to be guaranteed by the
Veterans Administration. Prudential had an agreement whereby Prudential Insurance Company of
America would purchase from it those one hundred
mortgages. Hartford stipulates that not one of the
one hundred houses was ever completed by Cassady
in conformance with the rules of the Veterans Administration. Thus Prudential was never able to sell
the mortgages and has been compelled to hold these
low grade mortgages in its portfolio. It has suffered
the damages awarded by the trial Court. Hartford
16
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by its brief does not contest the amount or method
of computing the damages (p. 26 of Appellant's
brief.)
It is with this background that the Contract
Bond must be understood and interpreted. The July
19, 1950 construction contract (Ex. PR-2) was incorporated by reference into the bond.
The last "Whereas" clause of the Bond recites
that "the Lender Obligee, Title Obligee and Owner
Obligee each desire protection as their interests may
appear, in the event of the default by the Principal
under said contract..." (Emphasis ours).
The bond then undertakes in the next paragraph
to indemnify and save harmless the obligees "from
all loss, cost, damage, and expense which they may
suffer . . ." Paragraph 2 of the Conditions in the
Bond gives Hartford the option to cure any of Cassady's defaults in performance of the construction
contract (but Hartford never offered to cure any
of the defaults). Then paragraph 6 reads:
"The prior written approval of SURETY
shall be required with regard to any changes
or alterations in said contract where the cost
thereof, added to prior changes or alterations,
causes the aggregate cost of all changes and
alterations to exceed 10 per cent of the original contract price; but, except as to the foregoing, any alterations which may be made
in the terms of the contract, or in the
work to be done under it, or the giving by the Obligees of any extension of
17
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time for the performance of the contract,
or any other forbearance on the part of either
the Obligees or PRINCIPAL to the other,
shall not in any way release SURETY or
PRINCIPAL of the obligations of this instrument, notice of SURETY of any such alterations, extension, or forbearance being
hereby waived."
All of the changes and alterations pointed to
by Appellant to excuse its liability under the Bond
do not even approximate 10% of the original contract price of $763,000.00. In addition, the extra
costs, minor changes and alterations were all taken
into account in February of 1951 when an extension of time was granted to Cassady and the price
per house was increased, with the written consent
of Appellant (Ex. PR-6).
Point I of Appellants brief refers to four Findings in this case which it claims are "wholly unsupported by the evidence":
(a) Finding 4, refering only to the Felt's
qualification to do business, undoubtedly will be
covered by Felt's brief but is immaterial and irrevelant as to Hartford's liability to Prudential;
(b) Finding 27 refers to a purported failure
of Prudential to collect lien waivers from Accountants and the Court found that such did not result
in any damage to Hartford or Cassady. In the first
place this collection of lien waivers was a duty imposed on Accountants and merely an optional right
18
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vested in Prudential. See Ex. PR-7—contract of June
16, 1950, Ex. PR-8—contract of August 10, 1950
and Ex. PR-6, Supplemental Agreement of February
16, 1951. In the second place, Prudential could only
disburse funds as authorized by the borrowers and
they together with Cassady, Felt and Hartford
granted it discretionary powers of disbursement
and none imposed upon Prudential a duty to collect
lien waivers. This point will be more fully discussed in Point VII of this brief.
(c) Finding 29 is criticized on the ground
that the Court "apparently determined that Cassady should not have commenced work until all
of the mortgages had been executed and recorded."
The finding does not say or infer that. It relates
to the undisputed fact that the "delay" in disbursing funds complained about by Appellant and Cassady was not by reason of any fault on the part
of Prudential as Cassady or Appellant knew that
no funds could be disbursed until the mortgages had
been executed and recorded. Cassady knew of its
own financial means, its own credit sources and
abilities and elected to commence and prosecute work
prior to the recording of any of the mortgages. The
evidence shows that Cassady knew that there was
a separate loan agreement on each of the 100 separate lots and Prudential would not advance money
on a lot if the mortgage had not been recorded (C.
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J. Cassady's testimony R. 250-1). Cassady took the
initiative in going forward with its own money, subcontractors and credit. If Cassady had considered
itself delayed by Felt not paying the money on a certain schedule, Cassady could have extended the contract completion date until such had been corrected.
Nevertheless Cassady plunged forward in building
houses. It knew that it had no right to claim any
money until each individual house was partially
completed. The said construction contract further
bound Cassady to arrange with its sub contractors
to hold off their claims for payment in accordance
with the percentage of completion schedule. In no
event was more than 75 % of the agreed price per
house to be paid until it had "passed all necessary
inspections of the Veterans Administration, . . .".
(Para.23ofEx.PR-2).
(d) Finding 39 is a determination that the
alleged breaches by Felt were not "substantial" and
that if such had been, still the Supplemental Agreement of February 16, 1951 resolved the same by the
extensions of time and increase in the price per
house to be paid by Felt to Cassady. We shall leave
to Felt a detailed response to the individual asserted
breaches. At this time we point out that even if Felt
had breached its contractual duties to Cassady,
Hartford would still be liable severally, as a compensated surety, to Prudential. This point will be
20
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discussed more in detail elsewhere in this brief.
Likewise we shall analyze elsewhere in detail the
effect of the accord and compromise arrangement
accomplished by the Supplemental Agreement of
February 16, 1951. We reiterate that the record
shows that the purported breaches attributed by
Appellant to Felt were not material. A compensated
surety will not be discharged unless it shows actual
prejudice to it by some departure by the obligee—
there must be a material variance from the contract
and only in such event there is a pro-tanto discharge of the surety.
50 Am. Jur., Suretyship, Sec. 320, Pg.
1115.
Appellant's "escape" paragraph is paragraph
3 of the conditions of the Bond which reads:
"The SURETY shall not be liable under
this Bond to the Obligees, and either of them,
unless the Obligees, or either of them, shall
make payment to the PRINCIPAL in reasonable compliance with the terms of said contract as to payments, and each shall perform
all other obligations to be performed by each
Obligee under said contract at the time and
in the manner therein set forth."
The obligations, referred to therein are contained in "said contract" being the construction contract
of July 19, 1950 (Ex. PR-2) between Felt and Cassady. Prudential and Pacific demanded the Bond
as a condition precedent to the loaning of any monies
21
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or the insuring of the mortgage liens. Any asserted
breach by Felt could not be held against Prudential
as it had no duties under "said contract".
Elsewhere in this brief we shall touch upon
rules of construction of contracts executed by compensated sureties and the strict construction in
favor of the obligees. The co-relative rule is that
ambiguities extant in the contract of the compensated surety shall be resolved against the surety.
The following "hornbook" rule is vital in considering the Findings of the trial court:
"In a law case the trial judge sitting
without a jury serves in two capacities. He
finds the facts as a jury would and applies the
law; we may not therefore go further into
questions of fact in a law case tried to the
court than we could in a law case tried to
the jury. The judge passes exclusively upon
the credibility of the witnesses and the weight
of the evidence". (Colemere vs. Lay ton, 82
Utah 142, 22 Pac. (2nd) 218.)
Of equal importance is
" . . . that on conflicting matters the evidence is to be viewed in the light most favorable to the party for whom judgment was
entered, and when so viewed, if there is evidence supporting the judgment it will not
be disturbed." (Staley vs. Grant, 2 Ut. (2d)
421, 276 Pac. (2d) 489.)
It is submitted that there is substantial evidence
supporting each and every one of the Findings
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questioned by Appellant, and that within the operating ambit of the foregoing rules said Findings
should not be disturbed on appeal.
POINT III
THE PARTIES TO THE PRIMARY CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT AND THE CONTRACT BOND COMPROMISED AND SETTLED ANY AND ALL PRIOR
CLAIMED CONTRACT BREACHES BY THE SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT OF FEBRUARY 16, 1951.
POINT IV
HARTFORD IS ESTOPPED TO DENY THAT THE
SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT OF FEBRUARY 16,
1951 COMPROMISED AND SETTLED PRIOR ALLEGED BREACHES BY FELT AND PRUDENTIAL.
During the last five months of 1950 and January of 1951 difficulties arose on the project. Cassady complained that it had been injured by the
slowness of Felt in selling the lots and the consequent delays in making money available to Cassady from the Veterans' mortgages to Prudential.
The cost of materials had been going up. Prudential
was unable to disburse any money until appropriate
mortgages had been executed and recorded. It had
been delayed because of the necessity of first having
the proposed Veteran borrower approved by the U.
S. Veterans Administration before any action could
be taken by its own loan committee.
Cassady had also complained about the failure
of Felt to supply a power connection to it at the
inception of the project and that it had performed
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some extra labor and furnished extra materials
for which it had not been compensated by Felt.
On the other hand, Cassady was wrangling
with its sub-contractors as to their methods and
supervision (Ex. H-33) and Cassady was not completing the houses on schedule, or at all. Both Felt
and Prudential had become greatly alarmed. Prudential's commitment from Prudential Insurance
Company of America to purchase the mortgages
as soon as they were guaranteed by the Veterans
Administration, was expiring. All parties realized
that something needed to be done to rejuvenate the
project.
It was with these urgent problems before them
that the Supplemental Agreement (Ex. PR-6) dated
February 16, 1951 was drawn and executed. The
last "Whereas" clause reads:
"WHEREAS, conditions have arisen
whereby the parties deem it necessary and
expedient to amend, modify, supplement and
adjust certain provision of the Primary Contract, Construction Contract, and certain of
the provisions of the Disbursing Contract,
as amended by the supplemental agreement
of August 22,1950."
This compromise arrangement accomplished
five basic things:
(a) extended the time of completion
date from January 17th to June 1st, 1951;
(b) set up new procedures for dis24
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

bursement of the mortgage funds, including
broad discretionary powers in Prudential;
(c) increased the contract price payable to Cassady on each of the houses above
the original agreed schedule;
(d) changed the disbursement limit
prior to final completion from 75% of the
total price to 90% of the total price per house;
and
(e) acknowledged and ratified the complete accounting by Prudential of all mortgage fund disbursements to that date.
All parties signed the document. However,
Hartford placed a limited approval when its turn
to sign came. As its bond was given only as to the
construction contract of July 19, 1950 (Ex PR-2)
between Felt and Cassady it endorsed its consent
to only the changes in that construction contract.
By this, it approved of the extension of time, the
increase in the prices to be paid to its contractor,
the changes in percentages and the new disbursement procedures so as to grant to Prudential discretionary powers. These three benefits and changes
were approved by Hartford and its bonded contractor, Cassady.
It does not seem appropriate or proper for
Hartford now to assert those matters which were
compromised by this Supplemental Agreement (Ex.
PR-6) as an excuse upon which to seek an escape
of liability. Hartford has had all the benefits of
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the extension of time, an increase in the price per
house and a flexibility in financing, yet it now wants
to revert to all the alleged prior breaches by Felt
such as: failing to furnish electric power in July of
1950 and delays in paying the requested progress
payments on schedule as a defense against its liability to Prudential.
At the time of this Supplemental Agreement of
February 16, 1951, Hartford's bonded contractor
had already passed the deadline for completing all
of the 100 houses and had not yet completed one
of them. Prudential could have stepped in on its
contract and closed off the project then, but instead
granted five additional months for completion. Felt
could have stopped the contractor at that point also,
but it agreed to the nearly five month extension
and in addition boosted the price per house to be
paid to Hartford's bonded contractor.
Here was an opportunity for the contractor
to finish up the houses and gain more money. Hartford apparently welcomed this extension and signed
its approval. Obviously Hartford considered this a
fair and proper compromise of the prior difficulties
or it would not have joined in the approval of the
same in February of 1951.
In reliance upon such compromise and the approval by Hartford, Prudential withheld and waived
its accrued right to step in and take over the pro26
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ject and agreed to make available increased amounts
of money otherwise not payable then. Hartford is
now estopped to assert prior, claimed breaches of
the contracts by Felt or Prudential. Hartford has
received the benefit of the extension in time and
the increase in price and funds to its bonded contractor and the Court will not hear its efforts to
deny such acquiescence.
Cassady, with Hartford's approval, then proceeded in its efforts to complete the 100 houses in
accordance with its contract so as to procure approval by the Veterans Administration. The inspection reports reflect numerous deficiencies in
workmanship and materials on all of the dwellings.
Though the construction contract limited the maximum obligation to pay Cassady to 75% of the
agreed price per house prior to final completion and
approval by the Veterans Administration, this ceiling was raised by the Supplemental Agreement of
February 16, 1951 to 90 %, by giving Prudential optional power to retain only 10% of the down payment and loan proceeds until a guarantee by the
Veterans Administration had been issued on the
mortgages after the houses passed final inspection.
The increase in price, the extension of time,
the increase in the percentage of payment up to
90 %, all aided Cassady to proceed. Still it lacked
the ability or willingness to complete the houses
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either by itself or through subcontractors. Cassidy's
letter to Mr. Gerald Jackson, the general carpentry
sub-contractor on the project, written during this
period on June 13, 1951 reflects the inefficient
piece-work procedures being followed, the absence
of adequate supervision and a statement that "at no
time has there ever been a material shortage which
would ever necessitate the laying off of men or prevent the hiring of additional men if the work were
progressing systematically." (This is Hartford's
own Ex. H-33).
The project again closed down. Cassady was
never able to procure final approval by the Veterans
Administration of a single house. Veterans Administration finally on October 8, 1952 refused to
guarantee the mortgages. Neither Felt nor Prudential could be blamed now for the shut down
after their generous effort in February of 1951
to give Cassady every opportunity to complete the
project.
Appellant stands in the position of its principal. Nothing appears in the record to show any evidence or an alleged breach of contract by Prudential, or Felt after this February 16th, 1951 Supplemental Agreement. Notwithstanding their efforts
to help out Cassady, it did not finish the project
or any house therein. The complete abandonment
of the entire project by Cassady soon followed.
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Appellant could have stepped forward under its
Bond and completed the project but it did nothing further.
The trial Court found as a fact that Cassady
had admitted, declared and agreed that Prudential
had performed all of its contractual obligations to
February 16, 1951 (Finding 17, PR-29-31). Further, the trial Court found as a fact that any differences between Felt, Cassady and Hartford were
resolved by extensions of time granted to Cassady
by the Supplemental Agreement between the parties
entered February 16, 1951, (Finding 39, PR-39).
This being a law case and there being substantial
evidence to support such Findings, the appellate
Court is bound thereby.
POINT V

EXPRESSIONS OF OPINION AS TO THE CONSTRUCTION OR INTERPRETATION OF A CONTRACT
BY ONE OF THE PARTIES THERETO AFTER A
CONTROVERSY HAS ARISEN AS TO THE LIABILITY
TO IT OF THE OTHER PARTY TO THE CONTRACT
AND NOT ACTED UPON BY THE OTHER PARTY
HAVE NO WEIGHT OR RELEVANCY IN INTERPRETING THE CONTRACT.

Appellant in its Point V-D attempts to apply
the rule that "contemporary construction of a contract by the acts of the parties is entitled to great
weight" in interpreting the meaning of a contract
(6 Ruling Case Law 852). Reference is made to the
29
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letter of Sept. 5, 1952, addressed by Mr. Wilson
Taylor, attorney for the Appellant, to the attorney
for Prudential (Ex. H-29) and Prudential's reply
thereto of September 10, 1952 (Ex. H-28) and also
to the testimony of Mr. Wilson Taylor (R. 200-205,
218, I. 219) as to a conversation in San Francisco during late September, 1952, between Mr.
Wilson Taylor and the attorney for Prudential as
to Appellant's liability under its bond. In that conversation Mr. Taylor denied liability on the part of
his client, basing his position on the grounds set
forth in his letter of September 5, 1952 (Ex. H-29)
to wit, that breaches by Felt of its contract with
Cassady were imputable to Prudential. Mr. Taylor
asserted that in such conversation the attorney for
Prudential said, "Well, you are probably right about
that." (R. 219).
The foregoing is the totality of evidence concerning the alleged "contemporaneous practical construction" of the meaning of the bond by the parties.
In order to understand fully the situation existing
at that time, it is necessary to refer to Prudential's
Ex. PR-30. This exhibit is the written demand dated
August 12, 1952, by Prudential Felt and Pacific
upon Cassady and Hartford to complete the dwelling houses in the Morningside project and also a
demand that they secure release of labor and material liens filed against the project. Mr. Wilson
30
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Taylor in his letter of Sept. 5, 1952 (Ex. H-29)
admits receipt of this demand by Hartford. The evidence shows that by September, 1952, the project
was uncompleted and that Hartford had denied
liability on its part to take over and complete it.
(Ex. H-29). A controversy had therefore arisen between the parties as to Hartford's responsibility
prior to the San Francisco conversation between
Wilson Taylor and Prudential's attorney. There was
no practical construction of the meaning of the
relevant provisions of the bond during the progress
of the construction work. The conversation between
two attorneys occurred subsequent to the cessation
of operations and subsequent to the controversy
which had arisen as to Hartford's liability. A few
days later (on Oct. 8, 1952) Veterans Administration refused to guarantee payment of the veterans'
mortgages, (R. 10, 11, 14, 52, 53). In February,
1952, the status of the project and the ability of
Cassady to complete it and fully perform his contract
was in serious question and a conference of the interested parties was held in Salt Lake City with Mr.
Wilson E. Taylor representing Hartford present
(R. 187). At that time Hartford knew that Cassady was without funds and unable to complete
the project (R. 215). Cassady had not finally abandoned the work "but he was probably willing to."
(R. 215). Mr. Wilson Taylor, as representative of
31
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Hartford, knew at that time that Veterans Administration had required "a long list of miscellaneous,
small-miscellaneous items that had to be done [to
the houses] to make them acceptable to Veterans
Administration and Federal Housing Administration." (R. 217).
The mere opinion of a party as to the construction of a contract, not carried into effect by
any act, will not amount to a practical construction
of the contract.
13 Corpus Juris — Contracts — Sec. 517,
pg. 549
Shaw vs. Andrews, 62 Fed. 460
Potter vs. Phoenix Insurance Co., 63 Fed.
482
James Poultry Co. vs. Nebraska City,
135 Neb. 787, 284 N.W. 273
"The opinion of the manager of the seller
as to its legal obligations under the contract,
as reflected by his statements in correspondence after the execution of the instrument is
not entitled to any weight in determining
whether a valid contract was made."
Miller v. Robertson, 266, U.S. 243, 69
L. Ed. 243
Previous to the time of the San Francisco conversation, a demand had been made upon Hartford
to complete the project and relieve the properties
from labor and material liens. Hartford had denied
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its duty under the bond to comply with the demand.
After the conversation, Hartford continuously asserted this same legal position. It did not change or
modify it, and was not induced to change its position because of the conversation. The controversy
continued. Hence there was no harmonious construction ever adopted by the parties. (Ellis vs. Stone,
21 N.M. 230, 158 Pac. 480; L.R.A. 1916 F. Pg.
1228; Hodges Irrigation Co. v. Swan Creek Canal
Co., I l l Utah 405,181 Pac. (2nd) 217.)
The statement of the attorney for Prudential
in tentative and qualified assent to Wilson Taylor's
theory of Hartford's defense was no more than an
expression of opinion regarding the law governing
the case and was not an admission of fact. It cannot
be applied in construing the contract. The admission of a party in relation to a question of law is
no evidence.
Crockett v. Morrison, 11 Missouri 3
Wright v. Quathrochi, 330 Mo. 173; 49
S.W. (2nd) 3
National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Richards
(Texas C. A.) 290 S.W. 912
Caswell v. Maplewood Garage, 84 N. H.
241,149 Atl. 746, 73 A.L.R. 433
Grand Truck Western R. Co. v. H. W. Nelson
Co., 116 Fed. (2d) CCA 6th 823, Rehearing
denied 118 Fed. (2nd) 252
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Atlanta and Lowry Nat. Bank v. Maughan,
et al, 25 Ga. App 25,131 S.E. 916
31 Corpus Jur. Sec, Sec. 272, Pg. 1026
It therefore appears that Appellants Point V-D
has no value in interpreting the bond now in question.
POINT VI

THE RULE GOVERNING THE INTERPRETATION
OF CONTRACTS THAT WHERE A CONTRACT BEARS
MORE THAN ONE REASONABLE MEANING AN INTERPRETATION IS PREFERRED WHICH OPERATES
MORE STRONGLY AGAINST THE PARTY FROM
W H O M IT PROCEEDS HAS NO APPLICATION IN
THIS CASE. HARTFORD'S REPRESENTATIVE CRITICALLY EXAMINED A PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF
THE BOND MADE BY PRUDENTIAL, ALTERED IT
SEVERAL RESPECTS; CAUSED THE BOND TO BE
TYPEWRITTEN IN HIS OWN OFFICE AND FINALLY
EXECUTED IT ON BEHALF OF HARTFORD. THE
BOND IS IN LEGAL EFFECT AN INSURANCE CONTRACT AND HARTFORD IS A COMPENSATED SURETY AGAINST WHOM THE BOND WILL BE CONSTRUED FAVORABLE TO THE OBLIGEES.

1. A strict construction of the bond against
Prudential is not justified as it did not draft the
bond in final form. Hartford was as much the author
of the bond as Prudential.
Appellants Point V-C represents an effort to
apply the well known rule of contract interpretation set forth in Restatement of Contracts, Sec.
236(d) which is quoted by Appellant. There can
be no quarrel with this statement, but it has no
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application to the facts and circumstances surrounding the execution and delivery of the bond which
is the subject of this action. Hartford's Ex. H 38
is a yellow paper rough draft of a bond which was
prepared by the attorney for Prudential (R. 42).
The evidence shows clearly that at the time this
draft was made the question as to the form and
effect of the proposed bond had not been settled
and was in the process of negotiation. (R. 232, 327,
328, 329). A supervisory bond had been drafted by
Hartford (Blackburn's deposition, Ex. H-40, pg. 5,
and also R. 414). Thereafter C. P. Cassady came
to Salt Lake City from Arcadia, California, and
presented this draft of bond to the interested parties ,C. J. Cassady's deposition, Ex. H.-39, pg. 6).
It was rejected by Prudential (C. J. Cassady's deposition, Ex. H-39, pg. 6; R. 281). As a result of the
disagreement as to the form of the bond, Prudential's attorney made a suggested draft (Ex. H-38)
and it was delivered to C. J. Cassady, who in turn
delivered it to C. P. Cassady. He returned to Arcadia, California, with this draft and delivered it to one
Van Horn, an insurance agent who wrote business
for Hartford. Van Horn in turn delivered it to
A. L. Blackburn (C. P. Cassady's deposition, Ex.
H-39, pg. 9, 10, 12; Deco Van Horn deposition, Ex.
H-41, pgs. 5, 6, 7; A. L. Blackburn deposition, Ex.
H-40, pg. 6). Mr. Blackburn then proceeded to make
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alterations in the draft (Ex. H-38) by eliminating
one paragraph in its entirety, changing the numbering of certain paragraphs, inserting the words
"have the option to" in newly renumbered paragraph
2 and adding an addendum. The bond document
which was finally executed by Hartford (Ex. PR-1)
was then typewritten in Hartford's office under Mr.
Blackburn's direction. (Deposition of A. L. Blackburn, Ex. H-40, pgs. 8, 9, 10). Mr. Blackburn at
that time was superintendent of Hartford's bond
department. In that capacity he had "general charge
of underwriting acceptance of bonds", (Deposition
of A. L. Blackburn, Ex. H-40, pg. 2). It was Mr.
Blackburn's duty to supervise and approve any of
Van Horn's bond writing or underwriting beyond
Van Horn's general limits or for any type other
than Van Horn had general authority to write
(Deposition of A. L. Blackburn, Ex. H-38, pgs. 3
and 4). Blackburn had dictated and prepared the
supervisory bond which Prudential had rejected
(Deposition of A. L. Blackburn, Ex. H-38, pg. 5).
It is manifest from this evidence that Hartford's representative and agent, Blackburn, had as
much to do with preparing and determining the
final form of the bond (Ex. P-l) which is the subject of this action, as did Prudential's attorney.
The draft prepared by Prudential's attorney (Ex.
H-38) was thoroughly "worked over" by Blackburn.
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He had complete authority to negotiate this bond,
and in the exercise of this authority he proceeded
critically to examine the yellow paper draft and
amend it to suit his ideas. The draft was no longer
that of Prudential as it had passed through Hartford's processes of examination and amendment.
There can be denying the fact that the bond in final
form was typewritten under Blackburn's direction
in his office, and then finally executed by him on
behalf of Hartford. Here is no situation where
the cited rule of interpretation of contracts will be
applied. Prudential did not prepare a bond and place
it before Hartford for execution on a "take it or
leave it" basis — a situation which characterizes
the cases where this rule has been applied. Neither
did Prudential present a printed or fixed form of
bond usually used in the conduct of its business and
require Hartford to execute it. It did prepare a
yellow paper draft of a bond which manifestly was
to be presented to the surety company for examination, criticism, amendment and final acceptance by
the interested parties — not Hartford alone, but
all of the parties to the bond. There is no evidence
that either Prudential, Felt or Pacific exercised
any unfair influence or pressure on Hartford to
cause it to write the bond for which it received the
sum of $7,630.00 premium. The rule has been well
stated:
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"In the absence of the taking of an unfair advantage, the fact that a contract is
drawn by the attorney for one of the parties
does not necessarily call for the application
of a strict construction against him." (Syl. in
Moore v. Freeman, 58 N.M. 139, 266 Pac.
(2nd) 674, 41 A.L.R. (2nd) 1388).
2. Hartford is a compensated surety and
doubtful provisions of the bond should be construed
in favor of the obligees.
As above stated, Hartford received the sum of
$7,630.00 premium for writing the bond in question, (Ex. P - l ) . It was therefore a compensated
surety. The rule is firmly established in Utah that
in the case of a compensated surety, doubtful provisions of a contract, the performance of which the
surety guarantees, are construed in favor of the
obligee. If a bond is open to two constructions, one
of which will uphold and the other defeat the claim
of the obligee, that which is most favorable to the
claim of the obligee will be adopted.
50 Am. Jur.—Suretyship—Sec. 318, pg.
1112
21 Ruling Case Law—Principal and Surety—Sec. 200
Annotation: 12 A.L.R. 382
Annotation: 94 A.L.R. 876
M. H. Walker Realty Co. v. American
Surety Co., 60 Utah 435, 211 Pac. 998
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Atlantic Trust Co. v. Laureriburg, 160
Fed. 90; 90 C C A . 274
Murray City vs. Banks, 62 Utah 296,
219 Pac. 246
Tolton Investment Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 77 Utah 226, 293 Pac. 611.
Hartford was paid a substantial premium in
consideration of its assuming the risk of surety on
a bond which its authorized agent had placed in
final form, after critical examination, analysis and
amendment.
3. Bonds of compensated sureties are treated
as insurance contracts and are construed most
strongly against the insurer in case of ambiguities
or uncertainties.
50 Am. Jur. Suretyship, Sec. 318, pgs.
1112, 1113
Annotation: 63 A.L.R. 721
Annotation: 100 A.L.R. 1452
National Surety Co. v. McCormick, 268
Fed. (CCA.) 185
Tibbett vs. Mercantile Credit Guaranty
Co., 79 Fed. (CCA) 95
M. K. and T. Rwy. Co. v. American Surety Co., 291 Mo. 92,236 S.W. 657
M. H. Walker Realty Co. v. American
Surety Co., supra
Coney v. United Surety Co., 217 N.Y.
268, 111 N.E. 832.
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The facts surrounding the final draft of the
bond (Sub. par. 1, supra) and these acknowledged
rules of interpretation (Sub. para. 2 and 3, supra)
nullify and obliterate any argument of Appellant
that the bond in question should be construed
against Prudential because of its history during the
process of negotiations of the parties as to its form.
POINT VII
PRUDENTIAL DID NOT VIOLATE ANY OF ITS
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS OWING BY IT EITHER
TO HARTFORD, CASSADY OR FELT SUCH AS WOULD
BAR ITS RECOVERY OF DAMAGES.

Appellant in its Point III asserts that Prudential was guilty of three distinct breaches of its
contractual obligations owing by it to Hartford,
Cassady and Felt and is therefore prevented from
recovering from Hartford the admitted damages
suffered by it. Each alleged breach will be discussed
separately.
1. Failure to obtain Lien Waver. There was
no obligation upon Prudential to collect lien waivers
from laborers and materialmen. That obligation
rested solely upon Associated Accountants, the independent disbursing agency. Proof of this assertion is found in the following relevant provisions
of the several contracts involved in this action.
(a) Contract of June 16, 1950, between Prudential and Syndicate. (Ex. PR-7).
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"It is agreed that disbursements of the
proceeds of the mortgage loans contemplated
by this agreement and the down payments
deposited with Prudential under this agreement, if any, will be made by Prudential to
Associated Accountants at the time and times
and in the manner herein provided, without
responsibility on the part of Prudential, for
the proper allocation and disbursements of
said funds by Associated Accountants; and
that payment by Prudential to Associated Accountants, as herein provided, shall be a full
acquittance of Prudential for said payments.
It is further understood between Prudential
and Syndicate that Associated Accountants
will disburse the funds received by them from
Prudential in payment of all costs of the erection and construction of said dwelling houses
and improvements to the end that the contractor and all sub-contractors shall receive
just and proper amounts due them. Associated Accountants shall secure from all laborers on said dwelling houses, from all
suppliers of material used in the construction of said dwelling houses, and from
all sub-contractors, written waivers of lien
and lien rights at the time of making
a payment or payments to them, and said
waivers shall cover or total the amount of the
particular disbursement of the loan proceeds
and down payment (if any) made by Prudential to Associated Accountants and from
which disbursement said payment or pay41
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merits is or are made. Such lien waivers shall
be delivered to Prudential prior to any further disbursement by Prudential and Prudential will be under no obligation to make a
further disbursement until it shall have received lien waivers covering all prior disbursemerits." (Par. 2, Ex. PR-7).
(b) Contract of August 10, 1950, between
Felt, Cassady, Associated Accountants and, Prudential (Ex.PR-8).
"Before any disbursement of any funds
is made by Third Party [Associated Accountants] as provided in the next preceeding paragraph, in payment of any labor and materials furnished on the job, the Third Party [Associated Accountants] shall obtain lien waivers from the various sub-contractors involved
for such labor and materials furnished up to
the period involved in such disbursement.
Such lien waivers will thereupon be delivered
by Third Party [Associated Accountants] to
Fourth Party [Prudential] as required by the
contract entered into between First Party
[Felt] and Fourth Party [Prudential] dateed June 16, 1950, in order that further disbursements of loan proceeds may be had from
Fourth Party [Prudential]. (Par. 4, Ex.
PR-8).
(c) Contract of February 16, 1951, between
Prudential, Felt, Cassady and Associated Accountants (Ex. PR-6).
"The balance of the loan proceeds, plus
any deposited funds and the down payment,
if any, shall be disbursed by Prudential from
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and after the date of this Supplemental Agreement at such time or times, in such manner
and in such amounts as in the sole judgment
and discretion of Prudential is necessary and
proper to secure the expeditious completion of
the aforesaid dwelling houses and to assure
the payment of all sub-contractors, materialmen and laborers engaged in work on said
project. The decision of Prudential as to the
time, manner, method and amount of payments shall be conclusive and shall be binding upon the parties hereto. Notwithstanding,
the immediate foregoing provision, Prudential is hereby authorized and empowered to
withhold ten per cent (10%) of all loan proceeds and down payments and not pay the
same until the dwelling houses shall have
passed final inspection by Federal Housing
Administration; Veterans Administration or
Prudential and all qualifications have been
met to secure mortgage insurance by Federal
Housing Administration or guarantee by Veteran Administration. (Par. 2 of Art. I of
Ex. PR-6).
"It is understood and agreed that the
sums indicated in the next preceding paragraph shall be paid by the first party [Felt]
to the sub-contractor involved through a bonded disbursing agency. All payments due from
first party [Felt] to the second party for
or on account of the construction of the
houses mentioned and described in paragraph
22 hereof shall be made from and after the
date of this agreement at such time or times,
or in such manner and in such amounts as
Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Association deems necessary and proper to secure
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the expeditious completion of the aforesaid
dwelling houses and to assure the payment of
all sub-contractors, materialmen and laborers
engaged in work on said project within the
limits as set forth in paragraph 22, as amended hereby. In no event, however, shall the
payments be less than those prescribed in this
paragraph 23 prior to this amendment. No
payments shall be made unless second party
[Cassady] shall approve and certify in writing that such payments are only for work
incorporated in and materials delivered to
the project. (Par. 2 of Art. Ill of Ex. PR-6).
It is manifest from the foregoing excerpts from
the contracts involved in this action that up to the
date of the execution of the Supplemental Contract
of Feb. 16, 1951 (Ex. PR-6) that all payments to
laborers and materialmen were made by Associated
Accountants, which concern was an independent,
bonded disbursing agency. The contract of August
10,1950, between Felt, Cassady, Associated Accountants and Prudential (Ex. PR-8)
affirmatively
placed the duty on the disbursing agency of collecting lien waivers and delivering them to Prudential.
There was no responsibility for this task placed
on Prudential. Prudential could refuse if it elected
to make additional disbursements from mortgage
proceeds to Associated Accountants if it did not
receive lien waivers from the latter, but it was not
prohibited from doing so. Neither did the contracts
condition such disbursements on Prudential receiving such lien waivers.
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After the execution of the Supplemental Contract of February 16, 1951 (Ex. PR-6), Prudential
was vested with plenary discretionary power and
authority in making disbursements. At its option
it could withhold 10% of any amount to be paid until the houses passed final inspection by Veterans
Administration, but here again such action was
optional and not mandatory. (It should be noted
that Hartford approved this provision vesting this
authority in Prudential by its endorsement attached
to the Supplemental Contract of Feb. 16, 1951 (Ex.
PR-6)). There was no requirement covering collection of lien waivers after February 16, 1951.
It is impossible to torture from these contract
provisions any duty imposed upon Prudential to
secure lien waivers as a condition to making future
disbursements from mortgage proceeds. Since no
such duty ever existed, there could be no breach of
contract on this score.
2. Neglect by Prudential to Withhold Payments or Require that Cassady's Defective work
be Corrected.
Appellant's counsel must make this contention
with his "tongue in his cheek" to use old folk speech.
Note what he wrote in his brief:
"We anticipate that Prudential Federal's
attorneys will contend that the contractual
provisions above referred to, were optional
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or elective and not mandatory. That may well
be true, in the sense that Prudential Federal
would not be liable in damages to other parties
for failure to take action authorized by the
contract. It did, however, apart from any
contractual obligation have a common law
duty to mitigate its own damages." (Pg. 41)
Counsel is entirely correct in admitting that
Prudential's authority with respect to withholding
payments or requiring Cassady to perform its contract was optional and not mandatory. It possessed
the authority under the several contracts (pertinent paragraphs being quoted above) to stop making
disbursements of the mortgage proceeds unless and
until Cassady effectually remedied the defects in
the houses reported by Veterans Administration inspection, but it was not compelled to do so. Likewise
under paragraph 7 of the contract between it, Felt,
Cassady and Associated Accountants dated June 16,
1950 (Ex. PR-7), Prudential could "at its election,
enter upon all the real estate herein involved and
complete or alter said dwelling houses, or any of
them, to comply with the plans and specifications",
but this grant was a right or privilege and not the
imposition of a compulsory duty.
There is no ambiguity or uncertainty in the
contracts as to Prudential's option to stop disbursements or to elect to complete the project upon Cassady's default, and likewise there is not a suggestion
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that Prudential was obligated to follow such courses
of action.
As to Prudential's duty to mitigate or lessen
the damages suffered by it by reason of Cassady's
failure to complete the houses so as to earn the approval of Veterans Administration and its guarantee of the mortgages, the following quotation from
Appellant's brief is determinative:
"The amount of damages awarded to
plaintiff, Prudential Federal and Felt is not
in issue in this appeal and we therefore do not
detail the basis on which damages to those two
plaintiffs were determined." (Page 26 of Appellant's brief).
The duty of a party to take such action as will
mitigate or lessen his damages goes to the question
of the measure or amount of damages. Such duty
does not relate to the determination of the question
as to whether a cause of action exists or whether
his action or lack of action bars recovery.
"In legal contemplation the term 'damages' is the sum of money which the law
awards or imposes as pecuniary compensation, recompense, or satisfaction for an injury done or a wrong sustained as a consequence either of a breach of a contractual obligation or a tortious act. Expressed in other
terms, damages are the pecuniary consequences which the law imposes for the breach
of some duty or the violation of some right."
(Emphasis supplied) (15 Am. Jur.—Damages, Sec. 2, page 387).
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The so called duty to avoid consequences cannot
arise until a cause of action has accrued which will
entitle the plaintiff to at least nominal damages.
1 Sedgwick on Damages (8th Ed.) Sec.
204
Dippold et al, vs. Cathlamet Timber Co.
( I l l Oregon 199,225 Pac. 202)
15 Am. Jur.—Damages—Sec. 27, pg. 423
Annotations: 81 ALR 283
Inasmuch as Appellant elected not to question
on this appeal either the amount of damages awarded Prudential or the basis on which they were determined, it logically follows that its assertion that
Prudential was guilty of breach of contract, barring
recovery because it failed to mitigate damages has
no legal substance. Appellant, by its acceptance of
the amount of damages awarded Prudential has
foreclosed the question as to mitigation, and in any
event the duty to mitigate damages arises only after
a plaintiff's right to recovery has been determined.
(3)

Failure to take over and complete project.

This point overlaps the alleged breach discussed
in B, supra, and is really the same proposition argued by appellant under its sub-caption B of its
Point III. It has been answered above. Prudential,
under the terms of the several contracts, was not
charged with the duty to complete the project. It
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had the privilege of doing so at its option. The privilege imposed no duty. Prudential did not breach
any contract in this regard. Appellant had the same
right and option to "cure and remedy said default
and complete performance of said contract." (Ex.
PR-1)
POINT VIII
IN ARRIVING AT A CORRECT CONSTRUCTION
AND INTERPRETATION OF THE BOND, THE COURT
SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT THE ACTIVITIES OF
PACIFIC AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THIS CASE
ARE WHOLLY IMMATERIAL AND IRRELEVANT,
AND THAT PRUDENTIAL IS A THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY UNDER THE CONTRACT BETWEEN FELT
AND CASSADY DATED JULY 19, 1950 (EX. PR-2).
THE COURT SHOULD THEN APPLY CERTAIN WELL
RECOGNIZED RULES OF INTERPRETATION AND
CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS.

Before reaching the heart of the controversy
between Prudential and Hartford, Respondent believes that it should invite the Court's attention to
certain subsidiary, but highly relevant propositions,
which affect the solution of the principal legal problem in this case. Each proposition will be discussed
separately.
1. Pacific was not a party to any contract
involved in this action and was not guilty of any
violation of the terms of the bond.
Pacific's role in this transaction was that of
49
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an insurer of the titles of the 100 building sites in
Morningside Heights upon which the veteran-owners placed separate mortgages to secure the repayment of funds loaned to them individually by Prudential. (Subtantially all of the mortgage proceeds,
under written authority of the veteran mortgagors,
were disbursed by Prudential to Associated Accountants under the terms of the contract dated August
10, 1950, between Prudential, Felt, Cassady and
Associated Accountants (Ex. PR-8). The insurance
contracts written by Pacific were A-T-A policies in
favor of Prudential and guaranteed that the liens
of the mortgages wherein Prudential was mortgagee
were first and prior, except for current taxes. Work
had been commenced on the project and material
delivered to the site prior to the recording of Prudential's mortgages (a fact known by Pacific). Pacific issued these policies upon the reliance of the
protection afforded it by the bond. (R. 169, 170,
171, 172). Since Pacific was not a party to any of
the contracts, Hartford, of course, has never asserted it violated any of them. Further, Hartford
has never asserted that Pacific violated any of the
conditions of the bond. It has resisted liability to
Pacific solely on the ground that Pacific suffered
no compensable damages (See Appellant's brief,
pages 59-63). Pacific's activities in this transaction
are irrelevant to the issues in this case and may be
wholly disregarded.
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2. Prudential is a third party beneficiary under the Contract dated July 19, 1950, between Felt
and Cassady (Ex. PR-2).
The above mentioned contract contains pertinent provisions as follows:
Par. 1. "The Second Party [Cassady]
agrees to supervise, coordinate and procure
the construction of a total of 100 houses upon
contiguous lots in said Subdivision to be designated by First Party [Felt Syndicate], said
houses to be built in strict accordance with
the plans, specifications and elevations on file
with the Veterans' Administration, a copy of
which plans, elevations and specifications are
attached to this agreement * * *."
Par. 2. "Second Party [Cassady] agrees fully to perform this agreement in strict
conformity with the specifications, plans and
drawings referred to, or incorporated herein,
and also in conformity with any plans, drawings and specifications in effect at the date of
this agreement required by any governmental
agency having the right to demand that said
work should be performed in the manner specified by such agency, and also in accordance
with the rules and regulations of the Veterans
Administration, the Federal Housing Administration and the Prudential Federal Savings
and Loan Association, as the case may be."
Par. 11. "Second Party [Cassady] agrees to furnish a performance bond in the
amount of $763,000.00 * * * for the faithful
performance of this contract, and the adequate, skillful and prompt supervision and co51
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ordination of the construction program, and
for the completion of such construction within
the time hereinafter specified. * * * Said bond
is to be furnished before any work is commenced by Second Party [Cassady] and shall
run to the First Party [Felt], to Prudential
Federal Savings and Loan Association, to the
Security Title Company or the title insurance
company issuing the title insurance policies
on each of said lots * * *."
Par. 18. requires fire insurance during
course of construction with loss payable to
Prudential.
Par. 25. provides that Cassady should be
entitled, in addition to all other compensation, to 50% of all other profits if it "shall
perform its undertakings in this agreement
to the satisfaction of the Veterans Administration, Federal Housing Administration,
and Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Association, as the case may be."
It is manifest that in this basic agreement
Prudential became and was a third party beneficiary inasmuch as (a) the dwelling houses must be
constructed not only with the approval of the V.A.
and F.H.A., but also of Prudential, and (b) Prudential is nominated in specific terms as a beneficiary of the bond which Cassady must provide
under the terms of the contract. Stated otherwise,
the violation by Cassady of the covenant to cause
these dwelling houses to be constructed with the
Veterans Administration's approval gives rise to
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a cause of action not only in favor of Felt, but
also in favor of Prudential. Under the decisions
of the Utah Supreme Court, Prudential is a third
party beneficiary to this contract and is entitled
to prosecute an action upon the same.
M. H. Walker Realty Co. v. American
Surety Co., 60 Utah 435, 211 Pac. 998
DeLuxe Glass Co. v. Martin, 116 Utah
444,208 Pac. (2d) 1127
See also:
Annotation in 81 A.L.R. 1271
Grand Lodge etc. United States F. and
G. Co., 2 Wash. (2d) 561, 98 Pac. (2d) 971.
Appellant in its brief does not question the above
stated position of Prudential.
3. The Contract of July 19, 1950 (Ex. PR-2)
and the bond which is the subject of this action must
be construed together.
Blythe Fargo Co. vs. Free, 46 Utah 234,
148 Pac. 427
M. H. Walker Realty Co. v. American
Surety Co. supra
DeLuxe Glass Co. v. Martin, supra.
The rule supporting the above statement is so
well established in Utah that no comment is necessary other than the above citation of decisions of
the Supreme Court propounding and applying such
rule.
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4. In construing the bond the Court should
apply the following established rules of interpretation :
(a) / / the recitals in a contract are clear and
the operative part is ambiguous, the recitals govern
the construction. If the recitals are ambiguous, and
the operative part is clear, the operative part must
prevail.
Shaffron v. Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Mills,
70 Fed. (2d) 963, 94 A.L.R. 543, 547
Wilson vs. Towers, 55 Fed. (2d) 199, 200
Moore v. Baasch, 109 Wash. 568, 187
Pac. 388
Irwins Bank vs. Trust Company, 195 Indiana 669, 145 N.E. 869, 146 N.E. 909
National Bank v. U. S. Trust Co., 184
Wash. 212, 50 Pac. (2d) 904
Ross v. Ross, 233 App. Div., 626, 253
N.Y. Sup. 871
12 Am. Jur. Contracts, Sec 241, pg. 776.
The bond, which is the subject of this action,
contains the following provisions vital in the determination of this appeal:
(V) The bond recites that Cassady is
principal and Hartford is surety and that they
are "held and firmly bound and obligated unto
Prudential (called Lender Obligee), unto Felt
Syndicate (called Owner Obligee), and unto
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Pacific Coast Title Insurance Company (called Title Obligee), "as their respective interests may appear as obligees."
(2') In the first preamble the contract
of July 19, 1950, is recited, "which contract
is by reference incorporated herein and made
a part hereof."
In the fifth preamble it is recited as
follows: "Whereas the Lender Obligee, Title
Obligee, and Owner Obligee each desire protection as their interests may appear, in event
of defaut by the principal under said contract,
said protection to be subject to the performance by the Lender Obligee, the Title Obligee
and the Owner Obligee of their respective 06ligations to the principal in connection with
said contract." (Emphasis supplied)
(3') The condition of said bond "is
such that if the principal well and truly performs all the undertakings, covenants, conditions and agreements of said contract on its
part and fully indemnifies and saves harmless the Obligees from all loss, cost, damage
and expense which they may suffer, either
jointly and severally, by reason of failure so
to do, and fully reimburses and repays obligees all outlay and expense which said obligees
may incur in making good any such default;
and further, if the principal shall pay all
persons who have contracted, or will have
contracted, directly with principal for services or labor or materials furnished under
the provisions of said contract, and shall keep
and maintain each lot or building site free and
clear from labor and material liens, then
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this obligation shall be void; otherwise, it
shall remain in full force and effect." (Emphasis supplied)
(4') It is provided further in the bond
as follows: "The Lender Obligee slmll have
prior right and lien under this bond as
against the other Obligees herein named"
And it is further provided: "The surety shall
not be liable under this bond to the Obligees,
and either of them, unless the Obligees, or
either of them, shall make payment to the
principal in reasonable compliance with the
terms of said contract as to payments, and
each shall perform all other obligations to
be performed by each Obligee under said contract at the time and in the manner therein
set forth." (Emphasis supplied)
The foregoing provisions quoted from Contract
of July 19, 1950 (Ex. PE-2) and the Bond (Ex.
PR-1) make it clear that Prudential, acting independently of Felt and Pacific has the right
to assert a cause of action in its favor on the bond.
Prudential is a direct Obligee. The terms of the
bond in this respect carry out and emphasize the
fact that Prudential was a third party beneficiary
under the contract. The bond was written in this
form in order to protect Prudential as a third party
beneficiary under the contract. It is further to be
noted that by an express declaration Prudential
is given a prior right as against Felt and
Pacific against the indemnity of the bond. This
provision specifically eliminates the troublesome
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question which arises in connection with bonds where
several obligees having separate and several claims
as beneficiaries. Obviously a surety is liable only
for the maximum penal amount of the bond. Unless this quoted paragraph were in this bond, the
three beneficiaries would be compelled to share pro
rata in the penal amount of the bond. However,
with this provision in the bond, Prudential has a
first and prior claim for indemnity. Its claim must
be satisfied before either Felt or Pacific can claim
the protection. In this case this question does not
arise because the penal amount of the bond far exceeds the claims of Prudential, Felt and Pacific.
However, the provision is extremely pertinent in
discovering the contractual intentions of the parties to this bond.
(b) Surrounding Circumstances: If there is
an ambiguity in a contract, resort may be had to
the situation of the parties and the circumstances
under which it was entered into for the purpose,
not of changing the writing, but of furnishing light
to determine the intention of the parties and the
meaning of the terms they used and when these
are ascertained they must prevail over the dry words
of the agreement.
Walker v. Brown, 165 U. S. 654,41L. Ed.
865,17 Sup. Ct. 453
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Kauffman v. Raeder, 108 Fed. (8 Cir.)
171, 54 LRA 247
Boley vs. Butterfield, 57 Utah 262, 194
Pac. 128
Reed vs. Forced Underfiring Corporation, 82 Utah 529, 26 Pac. (2d) 323
Fox Film Corporation vs. Ogden Theater
Co., 82 Utah 279,17 Pac. (2d) 294, 90 A.L.R.
1299.
(c) Attainment of factual results. "When it
becomes clear that the parties intended to produce
a certain factual result, interpretation should be
affected by reasonable and necessary implications,
so that the legal effect then given to the instrument
will be such as to attain the intended factual result.
A court may thus be able to realize the aims and
purposes of the parties, even though their express
words would otherwise be interpreted differently
and would produce different legal effect. This may
be done without the necessity of any formal decree
of reformation."
Corbin on Contracts, Vol. 3, Sec. 545,
pgs. 90, 91.
POINT IX
VIOLATIONS (IF SUCH VIOLATIONS OCCURRED) BY FELT OF ITS CONTRACTS WITH CASSADY
CANNOT BE IMPUTED TO PRUDENTIAL SO AS TO
BAR PRUDENTIAL'S RECOVERY AGAINST HARTFORD ON THE BOND. THE BOND SECURED DISTINCT AND SEPARATE RIGHTS OF THE OBLIGEES.
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HARTFORD ASSUMED DISTINCT OBLIGATIONS TO
PRUDENTIAL WHICH DID NOT RUN TO EITHER
FELT OR PACIFIC AND PRUDENTIAL MAY THEREFORE HAVE ITS SEPARATE ACTION FOR THE
BREACH OF THOSE OBLIGATIONS. HARTFORD CANNOT DEFEND PRUDENTIAL'S ACTION ON THE
GROUND THAT THE OTHER OBLIGEES, OR EITHER
OF THEM, VIOLATED THE CONTRACTS WITH CASSADY OR BREACHED CONDITIONS OF THE BOND.

The foregoing proposition is declaratory of
Prudential's contention which, being denied by Hartford, created the principal issue in this case. Prudential's theory of the case was adopted by the
trial Court in its Findings and Judgment.
There are four propositions which stand out in
this case so strongly that they defy contradiction:
1. Cassady failed, neglected and refused to procure the 100 dwelling houses in
Morningside Heights to be constructed in accordance with the plans and specifications approved by Veterans Administration. (Hartford admits this fact).
2. Cassady failed, neglected and refused
to secure from Veterans Administration its
approval of the construction of such dwelling
houses. (Hartford admits this fact).
3. Because the said dwelling houses
were not constructed in accordance with the
plans and specifications approved by the Veterans Administration, it refused to guarantee the mortgages owned and held by Prudential. (Hartford admits this fact).
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4. As a result of the refusal of Veterans' Administration to guarantee said mortgages, Prudential suffered damages. (Hartford on this appeal has neither questioned
the amount of damages awarded Prudential
nor the method of the trial Court in determining these damages.)
It is manifest, therefore, that Cassady was
guilty of violation of the contract dated July 19,
1950 between Felt and Cassady (Ex. PR-2) performance of which by Cassady was guaranteed by Hartford. Since Prudential was a third party beneficiary under said contract it had a direct action thereon against Cassady for its violation thereof and an
action against Hartford as surety on Cassady's
bond. The bond itself specifically designated Prudential as an obligee thereof and recognized its
clear right to claim and sue thereon.
Prudential, therefore, respectfully but emphatically asserts to the Court that it has affirmatively
made its case against Hartford and the evidence in
the action fully supports that conclusion beyond peradventure.
Hartford, therefore, in order to defeat Prudential's claim must rely upon defensive facts, and
failing therein, Prudential is entitled to recover its
damages. The principal defences asserted by Hartford may be summarized as follows:
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(a) Felt was guilty of four separate violations of its contract with Cassady dated July 19,
1950 (Ex. PR-2) which would bar recovery of damages by it against Cassady and Hartford.
(b) The breaches of contract by Felt are imputable to Prudential so as to bar recovery against
Hartford on the bond of its damages.
It is important at this stage to take into consideration the status of the case of Felt Syndicate,
Inc. vs. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company,
designated as Case No. 8736 in this Court. This
above action together with the action of Pacific
Coast Title Insurance Company vs. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, designated as Case
No. 8719 in this Court as well as the subject action
of Prudential vs. Hartford were consolidated for
trial. However, separate Findings and Judgment
were entered in each case. These actions are now
pending on appeal in this Court. In the action of
Felt vs. Hartford (No. 8736 supra) the trial Court
found no substantial breaches by Felt of the FeltCassady contract of July 19, 1950, but reduced pro
tanto the award recoverable by it on account of an
alleged assignment of part of its claim made by
Felt to a third person. It did, however, allow Felt
to recover from Hartford the balance of the damages. Felt appealed from the part of the judgment
which reduced its claim pro tanto by the amount
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of the alleged assignment. Hartford cross appealed
from the part of the judgment allowing Felt recovery for the unassigned part of its damages.
It is obvious that if the Supreme Court affirms
the judgment in Felt v. Hartford and thereby disallows Hartford's cross-appeal or if the Supreme Court
not only allows Felt's judgment against Hartford
to stand but also directs that judgment be entered
in favor of Felt against Hartford for the pro tanto
deduction made by the trial Court, then in either
of said events Hartford's defensive fortification
in the subject case (Prudential v. Hartford) is entirely demolished. There will be a judicial determination that Felt was guilty of no substantial
breach of the Felt-Cassady Contract of July 19,
1950. Since there was no breach by Felt there was
no default to impute to Prudential to bar its claim
against Hartford, and therefore the judgment in
favor of Prudential must be affirmed. (Prudential
has hereinbefore demonstrated that there was no
breach of any of the contracts by it).
On the other hand, should the Supreme Court
reverse the judgment in favor of Felt against Hartford on the ground that Felt was guilty of substantial breaches of its contracts with Cassady (and
thereby sustain Hartford's cross-appeal) or if in
the instant case the Supreme Court should determine
that Felt was guilty of substantial breaches of its
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contracts with Cassady, independent of its decision
in Felt v. Hartford (A situation which is difficult
to envision in view of the joint trial and the one
record on appeal), then in such situation Prudential
insists that such breaches by Felt are not imputable
to it under the terms of the Felt-Cassady contracts
and of the bond now sued upon. If such contention
be sustained the judgment in favor of Prudential
must be affirmed.
For the purpose of this discussion, let it be assumed that Felt was guilty of substantial violations
of the Felt-Cassady contract of July 19, 1950 (Ex.
PR-2) in the particulars alleged and claimed by
Hartford.
Hartford relies upon the "escape" paragraph
of the bond to support its contention that the defaults of Felt are imputable to Prudential so as to
bar recovery on the bond by the latter. This provision reads as follows:
"3. The SURETY shall not be liable
under this bond to the Obligees and either of
them, unless the Obligees, or either of them,
shall make payment to the PRINCIPAL in
reasonable compliance with the terms of said
contract as to payments, and each shall perform all other obligations to be performed by
each obligee under said contract at the time
and in the manner herein set forth." (Emphasis supplied)
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Also of material consideration on this point are
the recitals of the fifth preamble of the bond:
"WHEREAS, the LENDER OBLIGEE,
TITLE OBLIGEE and OWNER OBLIGEE
each desire protection as their interests may
appear, in the default of the PRINCIPAL
under said contract, said protection to be subject to the performance by the LENDER OBLIGEE, the TITLE OBLIGEE and the OWNER OBLIGEE of their respective obligations
to the PRINCIPAL in connection with said
contract."
We are, therefore confronted with the question
as to how far and with what potency can the contractual violations of Felt be visited unfifer Prudential and Pacific so as to bar either of them from
recovery on the bond.
The preambles of the bond summarize the
functions of the three obligees in the proposed transaction and describe these functions in sufficient detail as will inform a court exactly what part of the
entire transaction each obligee was supposed to perform. The fifth preamble above quoted is of particular importance in interpreting the contract.
There is the rule of contract law quoted above and
which is re-stated as follows:
"If the recitals [in a contract] are clear
and the operative part is ambiguous, the recitals govern the construction. If the recitals
are ambiguous, and the operative part is
clear, the operative part must prevail."
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With this rule to guide us, an examination of
paragraph 3 of the operative part of the bond above
quoted is in order. It is suggested that this provision is open to two constructions:
(1) That the three obligees jointly and severally agree to make the payments to Cassady as
required of Felt by the basic contract, or to see that
payments are made by Felt as a condition to enforcing the bond. (This is Hartford's theory.) This is
an absurd construction. Applied to Pacific which is
not a party to the contract, it is requiring it to do
something impossible of performance. Pacific has
no relationship with Felt whereby it could force Felt
to perform its agreement with Cassady. Further,
in the alternative, it would require Pacific to pay
Cassady if Felt did not. The mere statement of this
situation shows what an absurd situation this construction produces as to Pacific. With respect to
Prudential, such interpretation requires it really
to guarantee the payments from Felt to Cassady.
This makes it an ultra vires contract because a
Federal savings and loan association is not authorized by law or regulations to act as a surety for or
guarantor of another concern's debts. In fact, the
Home Loan Bank regulations cry against such interpretation. Further, the second and third preambles of the bond explain clearly that Prudential
is a lender of funds to borrowers, who in turn will
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authorize Prudential to disburse the proceeds of the
loan to make the payments due Cassady from Felt.
These recitals clearly define the obligation of Prudential in the premises. They do not even suggest
that Prudential guarantees that if the mortgage proceeds are insufficient to make the contract payment
in full Prudential will make up the deficiency. Stateed otherwise, such construction requires the wildest
kind of distortion of the language to make Prudential a guarantor of the obligations of Felt.
With respect to the foregoing statement that
an interpretation of the bond which casts Prudential in the role of a surety or guarantor of Felt's
performance of the Felt-Cassady contract of July
19, 1950 (Ex. PR-2) would result in Prudential
entering into an ultra vires agreement, attention is
particularly invited to the fact that Prudential is
a corporation oMie United States of America. It
was organized and exists under and by virtue of the
Home Loan Bank Act (Sec. 1464, Title 12, U.S.C.A.)
The powers are defined by said Federal Statutes.
It is not and was not authorized to act as surety
or guarantor of another's debt. (Felt was not indebted to Prudential) (Deep Rock Oil Corporation
v. Salisbury 130 Fed. (2d) (8th Cir.) 387 Cf:
Tracy Loan and Trust Co. vs. Merchants Bank, 50
Utah 196,167 Pac. 353; Zions Savngs Bank & Trust
Co. vs. Tropic and East Fork Irr. Co., 502 Utah 101,
66
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

126 Pac. (2d) 1053). This situation calls into operation another well recognized rule of contract interpretation :
"An agreement capable of an interpretation which will make it valid or legal will be
given such interpretation if the agreement
is ambiguous. Such interpretation is preferred
to one which renders it invalid. It will not
be interpreted so as to be invalid unless such
interpretation is required by the terms of
the agreement in the light of surrounding
circumstances." (12 Am. Jur. Contracts—Sec.
251 Pgs. 793, 794 on this point.)
A case of particular relevancy on this point is
Pine River Logging and Imp. Co. vs. United States,
136 U. S. 279, 46 L. Ed. 1164, 22 Sup. Ct. 920.
Quoting from 12 Am. Jur. at page 794 the following
is a fair summary of the relevant holding in this
case:
"Contracts with individual Indians for
the cutting and delivery of a designated quantity of dead and down timber on an Indian
reservation will not be construed as authorizing the removing of all timber of that character on the reservation because such construction was put on the contracts by the parties interested and was approved by the government agent under whose superintendence
the work under the contracts was done, since
such construction would be inconsistent with
the regulations prescribed by the President
under the authority of an Act of Congress99
(Emphasis supplied)
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It is therefore asserted that the bond which
is the subject of this action will not be given the
interpretation for which Hartford contends since
such construction would be inconsistent with Prudential's corporate powers and in violation of the
Acts of Congress and the Regulations of Home Loan
Bank thereunder which govern and control Prudential's corporate existence and authority.
(2) As an alternative interpretation of paragraph 3 of the operative part of the bond, it is submitted that the correct construction thereof is that
as a condition to enforcing the bond each obligee
must perform its own covenants and promises. By
this construction each obligee is responsible for its
own acts and not for the promises or acts of the
other obligees. It may be supposed Pacific would
forfeit its right to claim under the bond if it had
refused to issue the title policies, because there is
at least an implied promise to do so — "TITLE
OBLIGEE will issue ATA title insurance policies"
—although such implication must arise out of the
recitals of the fourth preamble and not as an affirmative covenant. Prudential would lose the right
to recover on the bond if it had refused to make
the mortgage loans, but neither Pacific nor Prudential forfeits their respective rights to claim on
the bond because of the defaults of Felt.
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With these alternative interpretations — one
which leads to absurd results (or with respect to
Prudential involves ultra vires promises) and the
other which appears to be the reasonable one, it is
submitted a court will adopt the latter one (2 supra). This conclusion is amplified and reinforced by
the above quoted fifth preamble of the bond. The application of the rule of law above stated (Schaffran v. Mt. Vernon etc. Co., supra) requires that
this preamble govern the bond. It recites first that
each of the obligees "desire protection as their interests may appear79 in the default of the Principal
under said contract, and secondly, the recital continues that said protection will be subject to a condition. What is that condition? It is this, that:
Prudential must perform its obligations with respect to Cassady. Pacific must perform its obligations with respect to Cassady. Felt must perform
its obligations with respect to Cassady.
The preamble makes it certain beyond doubt
that each obligee stands on its own feet. One does
not guarantee the acts of another. The fact that
one obligee defaults does not deny recovery to the
others. With the preamble (recital) clear it controls the operative part, (paragraph 3 supra) for
the reason that Paragraph 3 of the operative part
of the bond is ambiguous (i.e. it is subject to the
two interpretations above indicated), and being
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ambiguous the recitals of the bond (i.e. the fifth
preamble) govern the construction of the bond.
Respondent has previously referred to two well
known rules governing the construction and interpretation of bonds of compensated sureties. The
rules are set forth in sub-paragraphs 2 and 3 of
Point VI of this brief. The first rule is:
"If a bond is open to two construction,
one of which will uphold and the other defeat
the claim of the obligee, that which is most
favorable to the claim of the obligee will be
adopted."
The second rule proclaims that:
"Bonds of compensated sureties are treated as insurance contracts and are construed
most strongly against the insured in case of
ambiguities or uncertainties."
There is a third rule as to compensated sureties Which is a corrollary to the two rules above
stated as follows:
«* * * t j l e m i e j s w e u established * * *
that a bond will be construed favorable to the
bonded if such construction is consistent with
the object for which the bond is issued."
(Title Guaranty Co. v. Bank of Fulton, 89
Ark. 471, 117 S.W. 537, 59 L.R.A. (ns)
676; Wichita v. Home Ct. Co., 151 Kan. 679,
101 P. 2d 219; Cert, denied 311 U. S. 673,
85 L. Ed. 436, 61 S. Ct. 49, and authorities
therein cited)
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Granting that the bond is ambiguous with respect to the issue here discussed it is submitted that
the application of the above stated rules would compel the construction here set forth in favor of Prudential.
Finally, the terms of the "escape" provision
(being Paragraph 3 of the bond above mentioned)
in and of itself bears out the construction urged by
Prudential. This Paragraph relieves Hartford from
liability unless:
" 1 . The obligees, or either of them shall
make payments to principal in reasonable
compliance with the terms of said contract as
to payments, and
2. each [Obligee] shall perform all other obligations to be performed by said obligee
under said contract at the time and in the
manner therein set forth"
The Felt-Cassady contract of July 19, 1950
(Ex. PR-2) specifically provides that payments for
the houses (Par. 22 of contract) shall be paid by
Felt to the sub-contractors through a bonded disbursing agency (Par. 23 of contract). The contract
then provides that if Cassady shall perform its
undertaking to the satisfaction of Veterans Administration, Federal Housing Administration and Prudential, as the case may be, within the time stipulated (and time is made of the essence) that Cassady
shall receive 50% of the net profit in addition to
compensation for such work as set forth in Par. 23.
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These provisions must be read in connection
with Preamble 2 of the bond which recites that the
Lender Obligees (Prudential) has agreed to loan
to qualified borrowers upon security of first lien
mortgages sums of money to be used in construction of the dwelling houses and the provision of
Preamble 5 which recites that each obligee "desire
protection as their interests may appear" but subject to the performance by obligee "of their respective obligations to the Principal [Cassady]" in connection with said contract (See Sub-paragraph 3
of Point VIII of this brief).
It is manifest that by the terms of the Felt-Sassady contract of July 19,1950 (Ex. PR-2) that
only Felt was under any obligation to Cassady to
make payments or cause payments to be made to
Associated Accountants for disbursement to the subcontractors, and further that Cassady was to receive
50% of the net profits only if it performed the contract satisfactorily to Veterans Administration,
Federal Housing Adiministration and Prudential
as the case may be. Cassady never did earn the approval of Veterans Administration or of Prudential (FHA is not involved). It, therefore, never
earned the right to share in the profits, if any.
Felt was, therefore, the party under the contract which was charged with the responsibility of
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making or causing to be made payments for and
on account of the sub-contractors — not Prudential
and not Pacific. However, under the provision of the
"escape" paragraph of the bond, either Prudential
or Pacific at the election of either might make such
payments or cause them to be made. Note that the
provisions of the paragraph recite "that unless the
Obligees, or either of them shall make the payments
etc," These words allowed and permitted either Prudential or Pacific to make the payments if Felt did
not but did not require them to do so. The obligation was imposed on Felt. The phraseology was intended to allow either Prudential or Pacific to exercise such right, but there was no compulsion on
them to do so in order to claim under the bond. This
conclusion is reinforced by the additional provision
of the "escape" paragraph that payments should be
made to Cassady "in reasonable compliance with
the terms of said contract as to payments" What
terms of the contract required Prudential or Pacific to make payments? There are none. The duty was
Felts.
Of importance is the second provision of the
"escape" paragraph — "unless each (obligee) shall
perform all other obligations to be performed by each
obligee under said contract". There can be no doubt
that as to obligations other than the payment of
money, each obligee stood on its own feet — "obliga73
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tions to be performed by each obligee". Here is a
plain unambiguous recognition that each obligee in
order to claim on the bond must perform the obligation assumed by it above — not the other obligee's
obligations. It is apparent that Hartford's interpretation of the first condition of the "escape" paragraph is at variance with the unambiguous declaration of the second provision. The interpretation
hereby submitted by Prudential brings the two provisions into harmony, and does no violence to the
language of either provision. All other rules of construction aside, it is submitted that it is the reasonable and logical interpretation and is wholly consistent with the external facts and circumstances
shown by the evidence.
CONCLUSION
Respondent respectfully submits to the court
that it has fully answered all of the contentions of
the Appellant in its brief and that it has shown that
the evidence before the trial court was substantial
and competent to support the findings and conclusions of the trial court. The burden of proof was on
the Respondent, as the plaintiff in this case, but
such has been fully discharged. Now the Appellant
is in a defensive position and charged with the
duty of showing to the court that the findings of
the trial court are not supported by competent and
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substantial evidence, and that the conclusions and
judgment are contrary to law. The admissions of
Appellant, as referred to above in the brief, make
it clear that it is in a defensive position. These admissions virtually made the case for Respondent.
Unless Appellant can convince the Honorable court
that its defenses are sustained not only by substantial competent evidence, but by appropriate rules
of law, the judgment in favor of Prudential must
be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
FRANKLIN RITER and
HARRY D. PUGSLEY
Attorneys for Respondent
Prudential Federal Savings &
Loan Association
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